Søren Overgaard is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. His main research topics are perception, social cognition, and philosophical methodology. He is the author of Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World (2004) and Wittgenstein and Other Minds: (2007), co-author of An Introduction to Metaphilosophy (2013) and co-editor of The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology (2011), The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology (2017), and In the Light of Experience (2018). His articles have appeared in various journals, including The British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Continental Philosophy Review, Philosophical Psychology, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and Synthese. Søren Overgaard is currently president of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, and, along with Komarine Romdenh-Romluc and David Cerbone, he edits the book series Routledge Research in Phenomenology.

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Perceptual Presence

What is most striking about perceptual experience is the distinctive presence of the world in it. When we perceive an object, in contrast to merely thinking about it or imagining it, the object seems to present itself or show itself directly to consciousness. I call this feature of perceptual experience ‘perceptual presence’. Philosophers frequently touch on perceptual presence, but it has rarely been investigated in its own right. I want to suggest that this is a shame. For not only does a concern with capturing perceptual presence seems to underlie the increasingly popular naïve realist approach to perception, as I will show. In addition, I suggest that perceptual presence may be key to understanding the nature of hallucination.

Conférence, 20 min

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